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This is a deeply flawed book, although it is not completely without merit. Mayer, who died (in January
2014) as this book went to press, may have been an accomplished scholar of ecclesiastical history (1), but
was a relative novice in Galilean scholarship. To explain and justify this judgment, I shall first highlight
Galileo’s trial, then summarize Mayer’s book, and finally elaborate my criticism.
1. The Trial of Galileo: Highlights and Approaches
The trial of Galileo involved two sets of proceedings by the Roman Inquisition.(2) They began in 1615 when
a Dominican friar filed a written complaint and another testified in person against Galileo. These friars
advanced two principal charges, among many: Galileo advocated the Copernican doctrine of the earth’s
motion, which they thought was religiously dangerous and probably heretical; and he defended this doctrine
from the objection that it was contrary to Scripture, by means of arguments that involved novel exegeses of
biblical passages and unorthodox hermeneutical principles. Indeed, the first friar attached to his complaint a
long letter by Galileo to his former student Benedetto Castelli, in which Galileo defended the earth’s motion
from the scriptural objection.
The proceedings were concluded in June 1633, with a sentence finding Galileo guilty of a religious crime
technically labeled ‘vehement suspicion of heresy’; this was an intermediate transgression, short of the most
serious crime, labeled ‘formal heresy’. According to the sentence, Galileo had committed the crime by
writing and publishing (in 1632) a book entitled Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems, Ptolemaic and
Copernican

; in it, he advocated the Copernican doctrine of the earth’s motion and implicitly denied the astronomical
authority of Scripture.
What connects the two sets of proceedings is an order which Galileo received from the Inquisition in
February 1616. In fact, in those earlier proceedings he was not prosecuted or even interrogated, for several
reasons: his letter to Castelli was judged in its essence to reflect traditional Catholic doctrine; Galileo could
not be found to have advocated the earth’s motion explicitly and publicly; and other more serious and
theologically pertinent charges could not be confirmed. Instead, the Inquisition decided to privately order
Galileo to abandon Copernican ideas, and he promised to comply. Another ecclesiastic decision was that in
March 1616 the Congregation of the Index issued a decree, declaring the doctrine of the earth’s motion
contrary to scripture, and temporarily banning Copernicus’s book On the Revolutions of the Heavenly
Spheres (1543); but Galileo was not mentioned at all.
Now, for 16 years Galileo kept his promise, more or less, at least to the extent that no difficulties arose.
However, the publication of the Dialogue reopened the proceedings. The reason why he published this book
stems from the fact that in 1623 a cardinal named Maffeo Barberini was elected pope Urban VIII. Barberini
was an admirer of Galileo, and had reservations about the 1616 decisions. In 1624, Galileo went to Rome to
pay homage to Urban, and was able to have at least six audiences. From these discussions, Galileo got the
impression that if he was careful and did not appear defiant, he could publish on the topic.
Thus, Galileo decided to write a book that was a critical examination of all the evidence for and against the
idea. The arguments on both sides were presented, analyzed, and evaluated. He tried his best to carry out the
evaluation fairly. The arguments for the earth’s motion turned out to be stronger than those against it,
although admittedly not conclusive. This was at worst an implicit advocacy of the probability of
Copernicanism. Galileo’s gamble was that friendly Church officials would not blame him for this, because
they would recognize that his advocacy was not explicit or absolute, and so was within the spirit of the
Inquisition’s 1616 order.
Galileo’s effort got him into trouble because of some issues pertaining to the precise wording and content of
that Inquisition order. In 1632, a document dated 1616 emerged to the effect that the Inquisition’s
commissary Michelangelo Seghizzi had ordered Galileo not to support, defend, or teach Copernicanism in
any manner whatever. Galileo had been under the impression that the order was the one which had been
conveyed to him by cardinal-inquisitor Robert Bellarmine; it stated that Galileo was not supposed to support
or defend Copernicanism, but said nothing more than this. Seghizzi’s order was obviously more stringent
than Bellarmine’s: a critical examination of pro and anti-Copernican arguments is clearly a manner of
teaching Copernicanism (and so a violation of Seghizzi’s order), whereas it might not be regarded as an
instance of supporting or defending Copernicanism (and so not a violation of Bellarmine’s order).
Galileo’s trial can be studied from several points of view: the history of physics and astronomy. since the
earth’s motion was a key issue of the Copernican Revolution; methodology and the philosophy of science,
since the denial of scientific authority to Scripture was an epoch-making principle about proper procedure;
and general cultural history, since the episode embodies lessons about the relationship between science and
religion (apparently implying their incompatibility).
2. Mayer’s Approach and Account
However, Mayer’s book approaches Galileo’s trial from the point of view of law, specifically ecclesiastic or
canon law. For the episode was also a legal event. Mayer finds the relevant law to some extent in formal
ecclesiastic decrees establishing the tribunal of the Inquisition and governing its procedures, but to an even
greater extent in two other sources: inquisitorial practice as found in archival trial records and minutes of
Inquisition meetings; and treatises by jurists and theologians attempting to clarify and systematize rules and
procedures, and manuals by experienced inquisitors reflecting on their experience with the aim of improving
practice and providing useful information to less experienced inquisitors.

Another aspect of Mayer’s method is the so-called prosopographical approach. He himself describes it (p. 2)
as an emphasis on the biographies of the historical agents, aiming to ascertain their motives and thus help us
understand the complexity of events.
Using these two approaches, Mayer elaborates a substantive account of Galileo’s trial that may be
summarized as follows. Mayer uses as a blueprint the ideal type of an Inquisition trial, as one can reconstruct
it from inquisitorial practice, scholarly jurisprudence, and ecclesiastical decrees. He is clear (p. 214) that
such a ‘typical’ trial is a theoretical construct not likely to be fully instantiated by any actual trial, so that we
also need to ascertain the actual proceedings of the real trial, and then compare and contrast the two.
Mayer distinguishes no fewer that eleven steps in a typical trial: (1) denunciation, by plaintiffs or witnesses;
(2) preliminary investigation by officials; (3) citation of the accused or defendant; (4) further interrogation of
witnesses; (5) formulation of charges; (6) ‘repetitio’, meaning re-examination of witnesses to clarify
discrepancies or follow up newly-emerged leads; (7) defense by the accused or his lawyers, after they have
been given copies of all testimony; (8a) consultants’ reports, providing expert (legal or theological) opinions,
and (8b) ‘summarium’, meaning that the chief legal officer (called ‘assessor’) compiles a summary of the
evidence, including important documents as attachments; (9) deliberation and verdict (including penalties)
by the judges (in Rome, the cardinal-inquisitors presided by the pope), with the whole being written up in a
‘sentence’; (10) abjuration by the defendant; and (11) ‘publication’ of the sentence, which usually meant
merely reading of the sentence to the defendant at a private meeting with Inquisition officials, or at a public
meeting in a church.
With some exceptions, Galileo’s trial fitted this scheme, according to Mayer. One exception is the complete
absence of the repetitio step (no. 6). Another is the incomplete adherence to the defense step (no. 7), since
Galileo never received written copies of the evidence. A third deviation is that the degree of publicity of the
sentence (no. 11) was unprecedented, for in Galileo’s case copies were sent to all provincial inquisitors and
papal nuncios in Europe, with orders to read it to all professors of philosophy and mathematics. Finally,
during the 1633 proceedings, ‘Galileo’s trial went most seriously off the rails with Commissary Vincenzo
Maculano’s extrajudicial move, apparently designed to secure Galileo’s admission of guilt’ (p. 216).
Now, with regard to these irregularities, Mayer is willing to call them ‘legal improprieties’ (p. 217). And he
is even willing to blame them on the officials, on the cardinal-inquisitors, and most of all on pope Urban. In
particular ‘Urban’s penchant for increasingly autocratic behavior, including his housecleaning of the papal
administration beginning in mid-1632, and blithe disregard for the law … should not be downplayed’ (pp.
217–18). However, Mayer is keen on pointing out that he does not include among the irregularities and
improprieties one item that has been widely discussed and commonly alleged to constitute the main and
most serious impropriety in the trial: commissary Seghizzi’s order, which emerged in 1632, which is found
in a document dated 1616, and which Galileo (in the first deposition dated 12 April 1633) denied receiving.
In fact, the main thesis in Mayer’s book is that Seghizzi’s order was really administered; that the 1616
document where it is recorded truthfully reflects was happened; that it was legitimate; and that it ties
together the earlier and later proceedings. This issue deserves further elaboration.
At a meeting of the Inquisition on 25 February 1616, Pope Paul V decided the following. Cardinal-Inquisitor
Bellarmine should summon Galileo and give him the friendly warning to abandon the Copernican doctrine.
If Galileo refused, then commissary Seghizzi should give him the formal injunction to abstain completely
from teaching, defending, or discussing the doctrine. If Galileo did not acquiesce at Seghizzi’s injunction, he
should be arrested and prosecuted.
At the following week’s Inquisition meeting (3 March), Bellarmine reported that Galileo acquiesced when
he was given the warning to abandon the Copernican doctrine.
However, in the file of Galilean trial proceedings, there is a document dated 26 February 1616, stating the
following: Bellarmine summoned Galileo to his residence and warned him to abandon the Copernican

doctrine; immediately thereafter, commissary Seghizzi ordered Galileo to completely abandon the
Copernican doctrine and to abstain from supporting, defending, or teaching it in any manner whatever;
Galileo acquiesced and promised to obey.
Finally, there is another crucial document, a certificate written by Bellarmine for Galileo and dated 26 May
1616. Its origin lies in the fact that rumors began circulating to the effect that Galileo had been tried,
convicted, made to abjure, and given penalties; Galileo became increasingly disturbed by these rumors, and
they may have also led him to wonder about the precise content of the Inquisition’s orders to him at
Bellarmine’s residence. Thus, he asked Bellarmine to write a brief and clear statement of what happened and
what the orders meant. Bellarmine’s certificate states that there was no truth to those rumors, but rather
Galileo was only informed that Copernicanism was contrary to Scripture and thus could not be defended or
supported.
Ever since these documents became accessible in the 1860s, scholars have discussed the issue that the
Seghizzi injunction document seems to conflict with the other three: Pope Paul’s instructions, Bellarmine’s
report to the Inquisition, and Bellarmine’s certificate to Galileo. From this conflict and other evidence,
various conclusions have been advanced, which can be listed in the following sequence of decreasing
strength or extremism: the Seghizzi injunction document is a forgery perpetrated in 1632; a forgery
perpetrated in 1616; materially authentic but historically inaccurate; authentic and accurate but legally
invalid. Some of these stronger claims, or some versions of them, were conclusively refuted already in the
1870s, but other weaker versions are well-founded and may very well be correct.
Mayer rejects all such claims undermining the legitimacy of the Seghizzi injunction. Instead he argues that
the document is materially authentic, historically accurate, and legally valid. His argument is based on a
lengthy (pp. 80–120) analysis of the kinds of orders issued by the Inquisition, according to the legal practice,
the jurisprudence, and the ecclesiastic decrees. This analysis tries to show that there was no clear distinction
between the notion of a ‘warning’ and the notion of a ‘precept’. The critics presuppose this distinction when
they argue that Pope Paul had ordered Bellarmine to give Galileo a warning, and Seghizzi to give him a
precept if he refused the warning; and that Seghizzi deviated from the papal order when he administered his
precept ‘immediately after’ Bellarmine’s warning, and thus without giving Galileo the opportunity to accept
the warning.
And here we come to another part of Mayer’s argument, pertaining to the meaning of two Latin phrases. One
is used in the February 26 document to connect Bellarmine’s action with Seghizzi’s. The phrase is ‘
successive ac incontinenti’, which is usually taken to mean ‘immediately thereafter’. In an erudite semantic
analysis (pp. 67–71), Mayer argues that ‘the translation of successive ac incontinenti as “immediately
thereafter” is open to doubt’ (p. 71). He does not explicitly tell us what it means, other than to implicitly
suggest that it just means ‘thereafter’.
The other phrase occurs in the Inquisition minutes of February 25 that contain the pope’s instructions for
Bellarmine’s initial action and Seghizzi’s possible intervention. The instructions stipulate that Seghizzi’s
intervention is contingent on ‘if he [Galileo] refuses to obey’, which is the literal meaning of the Latin ‘
si recusaverit parere’. Mayer interprets this phrase in the weak sense meaning ‘if he is reluctant’ (p. 261, n.
149), namely, if ‘Galileo objected is some way, perhaps in so mild a fashion as looking grumpy’ (pp. 73–4).
This facilitates Mayer’s justification, validation, and legitimization of Seghizzi’s ‘precept’.
3. Criticism
In my judgment, Mayer’s argument supporting his key precept thesis is unconvincing. His semantic analyses
strike me as arbitrary. His conflation of Bellarmine’s warning and Seghizzi’s precept seems to be a legalistic
exercise that fails to take into account the different content of the two orders: not to advocate – presumably
as true or as compatible with Scripture; and not to advocate in any way. Mayer also fails to appreciate the
conceptual difference between Pope Paul’s conditional order (not to discuss) and Seghizzi’s order (not to
advocate in any way, which would allow discussion aimed to refute). And Mayer tends to conflate and thus

to equivocate among the material authenticity, the historical accuracy, and the legal validity of an order.
Moreover, Mayer fails to appreciate that Bellarmine’s report to the Inquisition and certificate to Galileo
contradict the historical accuracy and legal validity of Seghizzi’s order. In this regard, he has a tendency to
dismiss these conflicting documents arbitrarily. For example, he generally holds what may be labeled the
Inquisition sloppiness thesis: ‘Ideally, the Inquisition under Urban and his brother Antonio’s guidance would
have done its work more carefully … That it did not should cause no surprise. In sloppiness, creative recordkeeping, and inventive jurisprudence the Inquisition treated Galileo no differently than most of the rest of
those who underwent trial before it’ (p. 5; cf. pp. 54–5). However, Mayer uses this sloppiness in a prejudicial
manner, to apply it primarily to documents he wants to reject, and not to those he wants to accept.
This flaw with Mayer’s central substantive thesis is merely the tip of an iceberg of difficulties. Many others
are methodological or more general.
Consider Mayer’s legal approach. Generally speaking, it is quite proper since Galileo’s trial is, among other
things, a legal event. The legal approach is also valuable because it has been unduly neglected. However,
Mayer betrays a constant mis-appreciation of previous scholarly contributions to the legal aspects of the
episode. Three examples deserve mention.(3) Mayer has a half-page critical discussion (p. 118) of Léon
Garzend’s 1912 distinction between a formal theological concept of heresy and a disciplinary Inquisitorial
concept; but he completely misses its explanatory potential, especially to help solve the problem of what
Mayer himself (pp. 3–5, 219–21) sees as the two main alternative interpretations of the trial, the precept
theory and the heresy theory. And regarding another important legal contribution, by Orio Giacchi in 1942,
Mayer mostly ignores his many insights; instead, he endorses one of Giacchi’s theses which is not only
untenable but also perverse: that Galileo should have been subjected to actual torture, and the fact that he did
not undergo such treatment was ‘the only serious irregularity’ (p. 205) in the trial. A third more recent
scholar also receives shoddy treatment: Mayer frequently cites the works of Francesco Beretta and accepts or
adapts many of his conclusions, but also criticizes him for at least two theses which he does not hold; one is
a crass version of the precept forgery thesis (pp. 58–9), and the other claims (pp. 154–5) that the
Inquisition’s assessor authored both parts (instead of only the first part) of a report on the Dialogue compiled
in the summer of 1632; here we have Mayer twice committing the fallacy of straw-man criticism.
Additionally, Mayer’s legal approach is too one-sided: he displays an excessive neglect of the intellectual
aspects of the episode.(4) For example, the book contains no explicit discussion of the content and structure
of the Dialogue, which was the crucial work that triggered the 1632–3 proceedings. And concerning
Galileo’s letter to Castelli, which occasioned the 1615–16 proceedings, Mayer does have a few pages of
discussion (pp. 22–5), but it never rises above the level of free-association commentary and pseudorhetorical analysis.
Thirdly, in his legal approach, Mayer seems to operate with a peculiar conception of law, which I would
describe as hyper-legalistic, hyper-formalistic, and self-defeatingly meticulous. That is, some crucial parts of
his account of the legal proceedings are such that the legal officials involved did not know what they were
doing; and such an account strikes me as a reductio ad absurdum of his notion of what it is for a proceeding
to be ‘legal’. Consider, for example, the 1616 Inquisition’s orders to Galileo: it was not just Galileo who was
confused; according to Mayer’s own account, the confusion was also in the mind of the chairman of the
Inquisition (pope Paul V) and of the most authoritative cardinal-inquisitor (cardinal Bellarmine); in Mayer’s
own words, ‘by seeing that Galileo got both a warning and a precept, Paul V took no chances that he could
wiggle out of papal clutches. Roberto Bellarmino gladly helped, acting on behalf of both pope and
Inquisition in summoning Galileo. Paul and Bellarmino could be excused if they were somewhat confused
about exactly what to do. The lawyers had not achieved much more clarity’ (p. 84). Or consider the 1632
Inquisition’s order to Galileo summoning him to Rome: at the Inquisition meeting of 23 September 1632,
pope Urban decreed to have Galileo summoned to Rome; two days later, cardinal-inquisitor Antonio
Barberini, the Inquisition’s secretary and pope’s brother, transmitted the order to Florence’s provincial
inquisitor; on the same date, cardinal-inquisitor Francesco Barberini, the Vatican secretary of state and
pope’s nephew, with the help of a legal assistant, transmitted the order to the papal nuncio in Florence; in

Mayer’s own account, they were all confused about whether and how Galileo was to be simply given a
precept, or first an informal order and then a precept only if he refused; and so Mayer himself describes the
whole situation as ‘tangled’ (p. 116), Antonio Barberini’s action as afflicted by a ‘discrepancy between
decree and letter’ (p. 116), and the intervention of Francesco Barberini as a ‘disaster’ (p. 117) and a
‘spectacular mess’ (p. 156).
The other part of Mayer’s method, his prosopographical approach, is also flawed, although in a different
way. The point is that biographical information is valuable, but Mayer too often includes too many details
that are irrelevant or distracting. For instance, the Inquisition meetings were usually held at the Quirinale
palace when the pope once a week presided the meeting, or at the residence of a cardinal-inquisitor at other
times; on 25 November 1615, it met at the palace of cardinal Paolo Sfondrato, concerning which we are told
the following cultural-tourism trivia: Sfondrato’s palace is ‘the present Palazzo Sacchetti, one of the grandest
in Rome, which shortly afterward sold for the colossal sum of 55,000 scudi’ (p. 43). Another example
concerns Pietro Paolo Febei, who was appointed assessor by pope Urban in January 1633 to replace
Alessandro Boccabella (whose surname means literally ‘beautiful mouth’); now, one detail about Febei is
found by Mayer to be noteworthy, i.e., ‘he cut a good figure. In his home town of Orvieto, they called him
“Bellafaccia”, “Pretty Face” ’ (p. 174); this enables Mayer to speak of a change from Boccabella to
Bellafaccia (p. 173)! Finally, during the 1633 proceedings, some decisions suffered delays due to the fact
that pope Urban spent a few weeks from late April to early May at the papal country residence of Castel
Gandolfo; on no fewer than three occasions (pp. 187, 196, 198), Mayer feels the need to tell us that Urban
was ‘purging’ himself.
There is another limitation of Mayer’s work that deserves mention. The issue involves archival research and
is relatively arcane in general, but becomes highly revealing in the present context. The present context is
one in which Mayer was able to exploit the fact that in 1998, for the first time ever, the Catholic Church
regularly and generally opened to scholars the Inquisition archives in Rome, officially known as the
Archives of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (the new name of the Inquisition). The single
most important source of information is the minutes of Inquisition meetings, recording discussions and
decisions. And the book’s endnotes (pp. 229–329) show that Mayer made a diligent study of them,
constantly citing them. This is, of course, commendable and in some ways impressive. Now, for the study of
Galileo’s trial, an even more crucial set of documents is the original manuscript proceedings, which have
survived, and are kept in a different location, known as the Vatican Secret Archives (ASV). Despite such a
name, the latter archives are also generally open to scholars with the proper credentials; they have been
scholarly accessible for much longer than the Inquisition archives; and indeed Mayer also consulted the
ASV. Of the many documents held in the ASV, the dossier of Galilean trial manuscripts is one of the most
precious. The Church began to make it accessible to lay scholars in the 1860s, and as a result complete
critical editions of the dossier were published, evolving with increasing editorial sophistication.(5) The
dossier consists of about 228 folios, grouped into various bundles of folded sheets, some with writing on
both sides, some on only one side, and some blank; these manuscripts accumulated as the trial proceedings
occurred. Unfortunately, Mayer never consulted or accessed this original dossier, as he himself reports at
one point: ‘The original is now in the Reserva of the ASV and allegedly inaccessible for consultation,
although Frajese was allowed to see it after I made my request. The photocopy made available to me is
useless for most questions of paleography and obviously all those of codicology’ (p. 255, n. 54). Frajese is
the author of a book published in 2010, and holds a version of the forgery thesis regarding Seghizzi’s 1616
precept to Galileo; and he does so in part based on his examination of the original dossier.(6) And Frajese is
not the only recent scholar who has had access to the original dossier: Beretta has also done so; and the
present reviewer can report having consulted it first in June 1986 and then again in April 2004. Mayer’s lack
of access is consequential because direct access is crucial for the resolution of some issues, and even for an
informed discussion of them. For example, apropos of the possible forgery of Seghizzi’s 1616 document, a
first-hand examination of the handwriting in the manuscript is crucial (cf. p. 61); and it is important to also
reach an informed conclusion about the fact that in the dossier, between the two folios on which the Seghizzi
document is written, another folio has been cut out and disappeared; now, although the multiple paginations
of the dossier exclude a 1632 forgery, they leave open the possibility of one perpetrated in 1616; however,

not surprisingly, Mayer is completely unaware of this issue.(7) Moreover, apropos of the authorship of the
two parts of the special commission report on the Dialogue in the summer of 1632 (mentioned earlier), it is
important to examine directly the original handwriting as well as the water marks on the folio sheets (cf. pp.
155, 304 n. 32).
One of the most damaging features of Mayer’s book is that his understanding of the Italian language seems
inadequate and his translations of Italian texts are often inaccurate. For example, consider Bellarmine’s
certificate, concerning which Mayer examines not only the final version, but also an earlier draft, in order to
discuss the possible significance of the differences; one change involved the connectives used by Bellarmine
to go from a description of what had not happened (a trial) to what had happened (a warning); the phrase ‘
ma si bene’ (meaning ‘but rather’) in the first draft was changed to ‘ma solo’ (meaning ‘but only’) in the
final version; however, Mayer (p. 65) tells us that the earlier phrase means ‘but although’!!! Or consider the
(already-mentioned) letter dated 25 September 1632 by Inquisition secretary Antonio Barberini to Florence’s
provincial inquisitor, for the purpose of summoning Galileo to Rome to stand trial; the letter states that
Galileo should come to Rome ‘per tutto il mese di ottobre’, which means ‘for the whole month of October’;
Mayer thinks that Galileo is being ordered ‘to come to Rome before the end of October’ (p. 116). Finally,
consider the letter dated 14 February 1633 by the Tuscan ambassador Francesco Niccolini in Rome to the
Tuscan secretary of state in Florence: Niccolini reports that Galileo had arrived the night before, and that
today he went to see the previous assessor Boccabella to thank him for his previous support and to seek
advice; Galileo also went to see the current assessor Febei; and he tried to see but did not find commissary
Maculano; however, Mayer tells us (pp. 175, 321 n. 166) that it was Boccabella who contacted and thanked
Galileo, and who tried unsuccessfully to see commissary Maculano, and that it was Niccolini who had
‘addressed himself to the new assessor’!!!
Last, but not least, there is a problem with the English language used by Mayer. It’s not anything stemming
from inadequate linguistic competence; rather, it may stem from an opposite characteristic: a mastery so
ingrained as to engender a total unawareness of the effect on readers of the writer’s many user-unfriendly
stylistic practices. Their combined effect generates an idiolect which I shall dub ‘Pidgin English 2.0’. One of
these practices is the ubiquitous usage of Latin words, such as: censura (censure), decretum (decree)
, denunciatio (denunciation), expeditio (concluding phase), monitio (admonition), praeceptum (precept)
, processus (proceedings or trial), repetitio (re-examination of witnesses), socius (associate), and summarium
(summary). Then there is the excessive use of Italian terms, such as: avviso (news or announcement)
, compagno (associate), fede (affidavit or certificate), giunta particolare (special commission), imbreviatura
(abbreviation), nipote cugino (relative or second cousin), processo (proceedings or trial), sede vacante
(vacancy), and staffetta (courier). In addition, Mayer too often uses English words which are very rare, so
much so that I am not embarrassed to report that I had to look them up in my unabridged English dictionary,
for example: accrete, benefice, brevet, chirograph, doceur, fettle, feudatory, and sequela. Here, I am
referring to terms whose usage could have been easily avoided, and not to technical jargon, which is
unavoidable in almost all scholarship, for example (in this book): breve (official papal letter), fiscal
(prosecutor), precept (judicial injunction), process (for proceedings or trial), and rehabilitation
(commutation of some sentence or punishment). As if all these things were not enough, Mayer almost
always gives hyper-literal translations whenever he quotes some original Latin or Italian passage; that is,
even when they are essentially accurate, his translations are so literal that they are basically unintelligible to
laypersons, and useless to specialists who know the original languages. Finally, to compound all these
obstacles to normal reading, Mayer often includes (in parenthesis) the original Italian or Latin text, and he
does so in the course of his exposition, although other times he relegates the original to the notes.
The general and methodological flaws illustrated above are not the only ones afflicting Mayer’s book. There
are others which, while still general, are less important. Thus, here for lack of space I will just mention a few
others, mostly without illustrating them, just as for the same reason in my critiques above I limited myself to
just giving a few examples for each criticism.
The book displays a pervasive anti-Galilean animus, expressed in language that is emotionally charged and
full of negative connotations. The clarity of the exposition leaves much to be desired, and frequently I had to

re-read various passages to fathom Mayer’s unclear grammatical references and chronological sequences.
Mayer completely skips any discussion of the period 1616–30, which is admittedly devoid of Inquisition
proceedings, but contains important developments, such as: the 1620 Index decree detailing the corrections
to Copernicus’s book; the 1623 election of pope Urban; and Galileo’s decision to write the Dialogue. Mayer
practices without acknowledgment a questionable rhetorical approach: he often seeks to find in the texts or
actions being examined instances of such things as the art of making the worse argument appear stronger,
and the art of unscrupulously winning friends and influencing people; but he applies this technique onesidedly only to people he wants to portray negatively and texts he does not want to take seriously. Finally,
this book contains more than a proper share of factual errors; for example, Galileo left Florence for Rome to
stand trial not on 21 January 1633 (p. 173), but on January 20; and Giovanfrancesco Buonamici was not (in
1633) Galileo’s ‘future son-in-law’ (p. 210), but rather was already (since 1629) brother-in-law of Galileo’s
daughter-in-law.
In conclusion, this book displays considerable diligence in archival research; its legal orientation is
potentially fruitful; its prosopographical approach provides useful information; and its central precept thesis
is challengingly provocative. However, these are tiny merits that pale into insignificance compared to its
numerous and deep flaws. These failings are such that laypersons and scholars can ignore the book, if they
are trying to learn about Galileo’s trial. Nevertheless, a few specialists could benefit from it by exploiting it
to sharpen their skills: how to interpret opaque texts, how to evaluate challenging theses, how to avoid
historical and philosophical errors.
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